The world is in the midst of a significant demographic transition with potential implications for the macroeconomic performance of the global economy. This paper summarizes the key features of current and projected demographic change. It then applies a new 10-region global model (an extended version of the MSG-Cubed model) incorporating demographic dynamics, to examine the consequences of projected global demographic change on the world economy from 2005 to 2050. A distinction is made between the effects on each country of its own demographic transition and the effects on each country of demographic changes occurring in the rest of the world.
Introduction
The world is undergoing a demographic transition from high to low population growth rates at different rates in different regions. What will be the impacts of this global demographic change on macroeconomic outcomes in major regions? How much of our current macroeconomic experience is caused by demographic change already under way? How important are demographic transitions within a country relative to the spillovers from the demographic transition occurring simultaneously in the rest of the world? This paper attempts to provide some preliminary quantitative insights into the answers to these questions. The broad patterns in ªgure 1 are by now well known. After a period of strong population growth up to the 1970s, population growth in developed economies began to decline as a result of falling fertility rates. This phenomenon also began to emerge in developing countries in the 1980s. 2 Projections from 2005 clearly indicate not only that the global population growth rate is projected to fall over the coming half century, but also that the phenomenon is spread across all regions shown in the ªgure. It is not only the trend in growth rates in ªgure 1 that is interesting. Also important are the levels of growth rates and their differentials across regions and across time.
Note that for the former Soviet Union the growth rate is negative on average beginning during 1990-95, and this is also projected to occur in Japan by 2010-15. Thus in some regions although the population growth rates are falling, the population levels are projected to continue rising for some time, but at a slowing rate. In other regions with negative growth rates, the absolute population levels will decline. Both the size of populations and their growth rates should have impacts on overall macroeconomic performance and its composition throughout the global economy.
Another important aspect of global demographic change is the change in elderly dependency ratios. The elderly dependency ratio is the ratio of dependent age population to the working population. It is well known that old-age dependency ratios are increasing as a result of falling fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. Figure 2 shows the elderly dependency ratio across the main regions, deªned as the ratio of adults aged 65 and above to the working-age population of adults aged 15 to 65. These projections from the UN's midcase scenario out to 2050 are dramatic. Most obvious in ªgure 2 is the rise in the Japanese dependency ratio from 1 elderly person to 10 working-age adults in 1970, to 7 elderly persons to every 10 working-age adults by 2050 (i.e., the ratio rises from 0.1 to 0.7). Similar but not quite as dramatic trends are projected throughout the regions indicated.
At the other end of the demographic transition is a change in the child dependency ratios. The child dependency ratio is the ratio of children under 15 to the workingage population. Figure 3 shows that this ratio falls signiªcantly from now until 2050. While the number of elderly that need to be supported by working adults increases over time, the number of dependent children falls.
An analysis of the impact of the global and regional differences in demographic change needs to take into account the effects of changing growth rates as well as the numbers of adults and children. This paper incorporates these projections into a general equilibrium model that allows for the changing composition of the population and captures its effect on labor supply, investment, growth potential, saving, asset markets, international trade, and ªnancial ºows. Although demographic change is extremely difªcult to model, with a general equilibrium approach it is possible, given recent analytical development, to get conditional insight into the overall impact of the observed and projected global demographic adjustment.
There is already a large literature on the impact of demographic change, 3 particularly in Japan. 4 However, most of this literature has focused only on what is happening in individual countries, without taking into account the global demographic picture. Exceptions are the recent work by Faruqee (2002) , Bryant and McKibbin (1998, 2004) , Bryant and de Fleurieu (2005) , Bryant and Velculescu (2001, 2002) , , McKibbin and Nguyen (2004) , and Batini, Callen, and McKibbin (2005) .
A number of alternative approaches have been followed in measuring the impact of demographic change on macroeconomic variables. Single-equation econometric studies tend to focus on the aggregate impact of demographic variables such as dependency rates on aggregate savings. Some studies include investment and explore the implications for the current account either directly or via the impact on savings and investment. Time-series studies on panels of countries such as Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1998) and Higgins (1998) ªnd a strong negative impact of dependency rates on savings. Higgins (1998) also ªnds a strong negative impact of dependency rates on investment and the current account. This result for the current account implies that the negative savings effect dominates the investment effect. The IMF World Economic Outlook (September 2004), using a panel of 115 countries, also ªnds a strong negative impact of the elderly dependency ratio on savings and the current account balance.
Other studies focus directly on the current account. Chinn and Prasad (2003) ªnd strong negative effects of dependency rates on the current account in a panel of 89 countries from 1971 to 1995. Similarly, Luhrmann (2003) ªnds that higher youth and adult dependency ratios tend to worsen current accounts. In both cases the youth dependency rates are more powerful than the adult dependency rates. This is supported by Helliwell (2004) .
Recently the econometric approach has been extended using vector autoregression techniques (Young and Lee 2005) in which both economic variables and dependency rates are assumed to interact in a dynamic way. Although their ªndings are preliminary, Young and Lee (2005) ªnd a strong negative effect of dependency rates on aggregate saving rates. Most of this effect is on public savings rather than personal savings. They also ªnd a strong negative effect of dependency rates on current accounts, suggesting that the savings effect dominates the investment effect.
An alternative to the direct econometric approach is to simulate economy-wide or global models (either estimated or calibrated models). A variety of general equilibrium approaches are also emerging, ranging from the multicountry overlapping generations (OLG) model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) 5 to an extension of the global trade and protection (GTAP) model in Chan, Shi, and Tyers (2005) and broad macroeconomic models. 6 None of these approaches, however, deals adequately with both the macroeconomic and ªnancial issues that are the focus of this paper, which follows the approaches of Bryant and Velculescu (2001, 2002) , McKibbin and Nguyen (2004) , using an intertemporal general equilibrium model.
Section 2 summarizes the theoretical methodology for capturing key aspects of the macroeconomics of demographic change set out in McKibbin and Nguyen (2004) in an intertemporal general equilibrium model. The approach focuses on the impacts of changing demographics on labor supply, consumption, and saving responses and how in general equilibrium these responses have an impact on investment, trade and capital ºows, and asset markets. Section 3 summarizes how the theoretical approach is incorporated in a new 10-region model of the global economy consisting of the United States, Japan, Europe, the rest of the OECD countries (ROECD), Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU), China, India, other Asia (Asia), Latin America, and other developing countries (DCs). In section 4 the methodology for calculating the impact of demographic change from 1985 to 2050 is outlined. Section 5 presents results for the contribution of current and projected demographic change to the macroeconomic outcomes, distinguishing between the effects of owncountry demographic change and the impacts of demographic change in the rest of the world on each country. A summary, conclusion, and future research directions are set out in section 6.
A theoretical framework for incorporating demographic change in a multicountry model
The theoretical framework used in this paper is based on that of Bryant and McKibbin (1998, 2004) as extended in McKibbin and Nguyen (2004) . For the pur-poses of this paper, the MSG-Cubed model (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1998; McKibbin and Sachs 1991) has been extended to include demographic considerations. Important changes include incorporating ªnite lives of individuals and allowing individual incomes to vary with age. Economic agents progress from being ªnancially dependent children to eventually being adults who are ªnancially responsible for their own children. The approach draws heavily on that of Faruqee (2002) , which extended the Blanchard (1985) model of ªnitely lived agents to include aging considerations. It is very similar to that of Bryant and Velculescu (2002) and Bryant (2004a Bryant ( , 2004b in the way in which children are modeled. A key difference, however, is that in this paper we assume that all adults bear the cost of providing support for children rather than having this support depend on the adult's age.
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Appendix A sets this out in more detail.
We assume that children are born each year to the adult population. Children who are 17 in the current year become adults in the next. The increment to the adult population is referred to as the adult maturity rate. It is this adult maturity rate rather than the child birth rate that affects the growth rate of the economy. The adult maturity rate is equivalent to the birth rate that usually underlies models of economic growth. As a cohort of adults emerges, they are assumed to inherit the level of productivity of the economy in the period in which they emerge. Over time as the cohort ages, it is assumed that the productivity rate of the cohort follows a proªle that is directly derived from an estimated age-earning proªle of the economy. In other words, it is assumed that the age-earning proªle is directly related to the marginal productivity of a cohort over its working life. An example of an age-earning proªle, that for Japan, is shown in ªgure 4. We assume that cohorts do not retire but just that their marginal productivity eventually declines to zero.
The potential labor force adjusted by productivity is calculated outside the MSGCubed model by aggregating up each cohort over time. In this way it is possible to capture the changing composition of the labor force as well as the overall productivity of the labor force. We are also able to use the same technique to keep track of human wealth by cohort. Thus the impact of changes in population growth and child dependency rates (i.e., the demographic shock) on labor supply and consumption decisions can be captured relatively well. The remainder of the model captures the macroeconomic impact on investment through changes in the marginal productivity of capital induced by the demographic shock. There will also be general equilibrium impacts on ªscal positions, asset prices, trade, and capital ºows which are captured by the rest of the model. We abstract from the problems of ªnancing social security systems, although they can be introduced in this framework following the approach of Bryant (2004a) .
In a model in which countries are each experiencing differential changes in demographic variables, it is very complex to untangle the underlying story of adjustment. In McKibbin and Nguyen (2004) we consider a number of simple experiments in a model which is a very much simpliªed version of the model developed in this paper. The reader is referred to that paper for a greater understanding of the story of economic adjustment to a generic demographic shock. Here we attempt to quantify the entire demographic effects and provide some intuition of the relative contribution of effects across countries.
Consider the dynamics due to a fall in the child birth rate in this model. The simple theoretical implications of this approach are dealt with in detail in McKibbin and Nguyen (2004) . Initially, the disposable incomes of households (after a deduction for supporting children) effectively rise in the ªrst 15 years, as there are fewer children to support. The real economic impacts on labor supply occur when there are fewer children maturing into adults and entering the workforce 16 years after the initial fall in the birth rate. Effective labor inputs are calculated using age-earnings proªles so that as the cohort of lower-birth-rate adults moves through the workforce, the effective loss of workers is magniªed by the loss in workers when they move through their more productive years. The decline in labor supply has the biggest per-unit impact at around age 40, or 40 years after the fall in the birth rate began, because this is the most productive stage of the "missing workers." The demographic transition caused by the decline in the birth rate lasts well past 100 years.
With a signiªcant fall in the number of workers, the aggregate macroeconomic variables will show a sharp decline by about 40 years after the initial shock, because there are fewer effective workers in the economy over time. Individual households will attempt to smooth their consumption over their lifetime, knowing that there will be less economic activity in the future and more effective income in the short run. However, it is unclear how large this effect will be, because there will also be a fall in real interest rates through a lower future marginal product of capital, and this will have an impact on the discounting of future income by households. Investment in the longer term will be lower, because there will be fewer workers available and the marginal product of capital will be driven down. However, there will also be a desire to substitute capital for workers to attempt to maintain consumption per capita in future years. The net effect in this model implies that initially investment rises as households increase savings to provide for future consumption, but eventually aggregate investment falls, even though the capital/labor ratio rises over time.
The modiªed 10-region MSG-Cubed multicountry model
The theoretical approach to demographics outlined in section 2 is embedded into a 10-region version of the MSG-Cubed model. The country and region aggregation is summarized in table 1. The MSG-Cubed multicountry model is based on the theoretical structure of the G-Cubed model outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) . • The model is based on explicit intertemporal optimization by the agents (consumers and ªrms) in each economy. 10 In contrast to the case in static CGE (computable general equilibrium) models, time and dynamics are of fundamental importance in the G-Cubed model. The MSG-Cubed model is known as a DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) model in the macroeconomics literature and a DIGE (dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium) model in the computable general equilibrium literature.
• In order to track the macro time series, the behavior of agents is modiªed to allow for short-run deviations from optimal behavior due either to myopia or to restrictions on the ability of households and ªrms to borrow at the risk-free bond rate on government debt. For both households and ªrms, deviations from intertemporal optimizing behavior take the form of rules of thumb, which are consistent with an optimizing agent that does not update predictions based on new information about future events. These rules of thumb are chosen to generate the same steadystate behavior as optimizing agents, so that in the long run there is only a single intertemporal optimizing equilibrium of the model. In the short run, actual behavior is assumed to be a weighted average of the optimizing and the rule-ofthumb assumptions.
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Consequences of a Demographic Transition 9 These issues include Reaganomics in the 1980s; German Uniªcation in the early 1990s; ªscal consolidation in Europe in the mid-1990s; the formation of NAFTA; the Asian crisis; and the productivity boom in the United States.
10 See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) .
11 Thus aggregate consumption is a weighted average of consumption based on wealth (current asset valuation and expected future after-tax labor income) and consumption based on • There is an explicit treatment of the holding of ªnancial assets, including money. Money is introduced into the model through a restriction that households require money to purchase goods. • The model also allows for short-run nominal wage rigidity (by different degrees in different countries) and therefore allows for signiªcant periods of unemployment, depending on the labor market institutions in each country.
• The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within sectors and within countries and the ºexibility of ªnancial capital, which immediately ºows to where expected returns are highest. This important distinction leads to a critical difference between the quantity of physical capital that is available at any time to produce goods and services, and the valuation of that capital as a result of decisions about the allocation of ªnancial capital.
As a result of this structure, the MSG-Cubed model contains rich dynamic behavior, driven on the one hand by asset accumulation and on the other by wage adjustment to a neoclassical steady state. The interdependencies are solved using a computer algorithm that solves for the rational-expectations equilibrium of the global economy.
It is important to stress that the term "general equilibrium" is used to signify that as many interactions as possible are captured, not that all economies are in a full market-clearing equilibrium at each point in time.
Calculating the impacts of demographic change
The demographic changes projected over coming decades are large, but are they likely to have an important effect on the economies of advanced and developing countries? This section uses simulations from the MSG-Cubed model to investigate this issue. An earlier paper (Batini, Callen, and McKibbin 2005) explores this issue in a four-region model. The same technique is used in this paper.
The approach is to ªrst project the world economy from 1985 to 2100 assuming the UN (2005) midrange demographic projection. The projections from the UN data have to be modiªed to ªt into our simpliªed analytical framework. In particular, we have to modify the birth rates of children and the maturity rates of adults to adjust for the fact that we assume a constant probability of death among adults, which is not consistent with the UN projections. We try as much as possible to match the population numbers from the UN projections. In addition, we make assumptions 102 Asian Economic Papers
Consequences of a Demographic Transition current disposable income (following Campbell and Mankiw 1987) . Similarly, aggregate investment is a weighted average of investment based on Tobin's q (a market valuation of the expected future change in the marginal product of capital relative to the cost) and investment based on a backward-looking version of Q (following Hayashi 1979 Hayashi , 1982 .
about productivity growth by sector and country using the approach outlined in Bagnoli, McKibbin, and Wilcoxen (1996) and extended in McKibbin, Pearce, and Stegman (2004) . We build a baseline projection containing the actual and expected demographic transition.
There are a number of ways to address the question "What is the impact of the demographic projections in this baseline projection?" One is to test the sensitivity of projections to different demographic assumptions. Because we want to calculate the entire impact of demographic change, we want to see what would be happening over the next 50 years if there had not been any demographic transition. We explore this question by effectively removing the demographic change from our projections. How this is done is shown in ªgure 5, which illustrates a stylized baseline projection for population. Population growth rates are higher for developing economies and fall quickly over time toward the same steady state as for industrialized economies by 2100. In order to calculate the contribution of demographic change to the projections, the projections are recalculated assuming that the demographic variables in the model, such as child birth rate and adult maturity rates for each country, are set equal to the long-run steady-state rates. These steady state growth rates are as- sumed to be equal in all countries and are those rates where the population growth is zero, given a constant probability of death of adults of 1 percent.
It should be stressed that in the intertemporal modeling approach in this paper there needs to be a well-deªned long-run steady state with all countries growing at the same rate. This is forced by having productivity growth by country eventually converging and demographic variables eventually converging. It is assumed that all countries will eventually have the same birth rates and death rates in the steady state. This implies that all countries will eventually have the same population structure as well. In the counterfactual experiment, we assume that these demographic rates apply from 1985 onward. The difference between the baseline with demographics built in and the counterfactual experiment with birth rates at steady-state values gives a measure of the contribution of the demographic transition in the current economies of the world. The precise nature of the steady state that we assume will clearly affect the results presented below. The results should be interpreted as indicative of the current contribution of demographic change to the economies and, more usefully, how these changes projected to occur over time will lead to changes in economies over time. Even if the reader is skeptical about the steady-state assumptions imposed in this study, the change in variables over time is less dependent on this assumption in the near term and primarily reºects the demographic consequences of the UN projections over time.
The process of removing a large shock of this nature is a conceptually difªcult exercise because the model assumes rational expectations in a variety of markets. Thus the initial conditions for 1985 (i.e., the actual data) in the baseline have expectations about the future demographic transition already embodied in stock variables such as physical capital stocks, net asset positions (both domestic and foreign), and human capital. Therefore there is a problem in the counterfactual exercise in 1985 for a number of years after the demographic shock is removed, because the model is capturing both the impact of the underlying demographic change and the impact of the change in expectations about future demographic change. For a period after the new information on the change in the birth rate is announced, there will be a large adjustment in asset stocks that reºects the revision in expectations. In an admittedly imperfect attempt to separate out the expectations revision from the underlying demographic change in the birth rate, we let the model run for 20 years to 2005. By 2005, much of this initial asset adjustment is completed, and the model is capturing more of the pure demographic effect and less of the revision to expectations from 2005 onward. In the following analysis, all results are presented from 2005 to 2100, after the asset stock adjustment and asset price volatility to the change in information in 1985 have washed through the economy.
We convert the 2002 UN population projections (midcase scenario) into the parameters of the model, given the assumption in the model of a constant probability of death for adults and a different but constant probability of death for children. This conversion is performed in a way which gives us as closely as possible the aggregate adult and child populations over time for each country as projected by the UN. It is not an exact representation of the UN projections, because the probability of death is changing over time in the UN projections and at this stage of the research we are unable to incorporate this feature into the model. Thus the results should be interpreted as illustrative rather than as precise predictions about the future.
Figures 6 and 7 present the deviation of the child birth rate and adult maturity rate, respectively, from the long-run steady-state rates in each year commencing in 1985. These are the basic shocks that are removed from the baseline in the counterfactual simulation and are interpreted as the demographic shocks in the baseline projection. Several important points are illustrated in ªgures 6 and 7. In each region from 1985 to 2020, child birth rates and adult maturity rates are falling. For Japan, the fall in the growth rates is actually smaller than the fall in the growth rates for developing countries, but this is starting from a rate below the steady-state rate. Thus the population is falling in Japan but still rising in developing countries despite a large projected fall in growth rates in developing countries. The difference between the growth rates of the population and the level of the population will be shown to be important in the results. In an important sense the prospective demographic transition in developing countries is larger than the prospective demographic transition in many industrial economies, including Japan. Much of Japan's demographic transition has already occurred in the second part of the 20th century.
The impact of global demographic change
The when we estimate the contribution of global demographic change, we ªnd that U.S. GDP growth is just under 0.6 percent higher (than otherwise) in 2005 because of demographic change occurring both in the United States and in the rest of the world.
The spillover of demographic change occurs through changes in trade ºows and capital ºows. For example, a rise in the labor force outside the United States would lead to a fall in the relative price of products from the rest of the world as well as a rise in the demand for U.S. products. The U.S. growth rate is persistently affected 108 Asian Economic Papers
Consequences of a Demographic Transition Figure 8 . Contribution to GDP growth of own versus global demographic change because higher foreign demand raises real wages and the real rental price of capital in the United States. In addition, the lower imported input costs would push out the production function in the United States and raise the U.S. growth rate during the transition. As can be seen from many of the results in ªgures 8 through 13, the global demographic shock is important for understanding domestic developments in each economy.
Consider the results in more detail. By 2005 there are more workers in the United States than there would have been without the demographic bulge, even though the growth rate of labor is falling through the demographic adjustment. With more workers in the United States, the marginal product of capital is higher than it otherwise would be, and capital accumulation would still be higher than without the demographic bulge, but eventually the rate of capital accumulation declines over time.
In each graph the global demographic change implies higher current and future growth relative to what would have happened without the demographic transition.
Other features of ªgure 8 that are worth noting include the result that the U.S. de-mographic change is detracting from growth by 2040 in the United States, but by 2010 in Japan, and by 2018 in Europe and ROECD. The timing is 2017 for China, 2020 for India, and past 2030 for other developing countries. Figure 9 shows results for the level of GDP relative to the case of no demographic change. Note that while the growth rate of GDP is above zero, the level difference in GDP will still be rising. Even though Japanese GDP growth is below the no- have been without the demographic transition in 2020. It is interesting that in 2050 the Japanese economy is projected to have a GDP 28 percent smaller than it would have had without the demographic transition in Japan. Thus the relative size of countries due to changing demographics can change signiªcantly. For example, taking account of global demographic trends, these results suggest that India's GDP will be 90 percent bigger by 2005 than it would have been without the demographic changes. This contrasts with the fall in the size of Japan of 26 percent by 2050. Figure 10 shows the impact of demographic change on savings relative to GDP for each economy. One feature which stands out in these results is that global demographic change tends to lower savings relative to own demographic change. The primary reason for this is that with higher incomes expected in future years when global populations are rising, consumers will be better off globally and need to save less in order to smooth consumption relative to the no-demographic-change case.
Countries and regions at a more advanced stage of aging, such as Japan and Europe, tend to have higher savings as a result of current and recent-past demographic fac- behavior, the outcomes for savings are also driven by adjustment to investment (discussed below). The MSG-Cubed model has the property that savings and investment within countries tend to move together with some offset through international capital ºows, but to the extent that risk premia partly prevent capital from ºowing across borders, the domestic real interest rate acts to partially equilibrate domestic savings and investment. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Helliwell (2004) . Figure 11 shows the results for private investment. The investment paths closely follow savings in each economy, although they are driven by different factors. As mentioned previously, there are different effects on investment partly on the one hand driven by the changing marginal product of capital due to changing effective labor forces and partly on the other driven by shifts in spending patterns and reallocation of investment from countries with low capital productivity to countries with high capital productivity. In the model it is assumed that capital is highly mobile, adjusted by a risk premium which is calculated on 2002 data. This risk premium is as- sumed to remain constant over the entire simulation period. Thus countries that restrict capital ºows in 2002 will also relatively restrict these ºows through the entire period. 12 Over time the countries experiencing rising labor forces are tending to attract investment, and those experiencing falling labor forces are tending to lose investment. However, this general pattern from own demographic change is changed 114 Asian Economic Papers
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12 Batini, Callen, and McKibbin (2005) explore the impacts of changing this assumption and allowing more capital to ºow to developing countries. The role of capital ºows in adjusting to demographic change is explored in Taylor and Williamson (1991) .
Figure 11. Contribution to private investment of own versus global demographic change
in the global context. Japan, for example, experiences a far smaller fall in investment over the period in the global context because of the much stronger demand for Japanese products from a rapidly growing world economy. A similar story applies for Europe, where own demographic change tends to lower investment over time, yet in the global context demographic change tends to raise European investment after 2015. There is both a U.S. effect and an effect as well from developing countries, in which a vast proportion of the population growth and economic growth is being sourced.
The net outcome of savings and investment is the current account balance. This is shown for all economies in ªgure 12. As expected, the demographic changes in Europe and Japan contribute a sizeable amount to the current account surpluses of these economies. What is interesting is that the global demographic change in both cases adds further to the current account surpluses of both regions. In the domestic case, resources are shifted from the aging economies into developing countries because of optimal saving decisions. The demographic changes in developing coun- tries and the United States tend to draw capital from the aging economies, attracted by a higher return to capital. Thus there is both a "push" element and a "pull" element in the demographic impacts on the current account. The United States in particular, but also China, attracts signiªcant amounts of savings from other industrialized economies. Overall, in 2005 the model estimates that current demographic change on balance has contributed to current account surpluses in Japan, Europe, ROECD, China, Russia, and Eastern Europe and to current account deªcits in the 116 Asian Economic Papers
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Figure 12. Contribution to current accounts of own versus global demographic change
United States, the rest of Asia, India, Latin America, and the rest of the developing countries.
The price that adjusts to equilibrate saving and investment outcomes, given the international ºows of capital, is the real interest rate, shown for all economies in ªgure 14. The real interest rate in each country is determined by savings and investment. The difference between real interest rates across countries reºects risk premia and expected future changes in real exchange rates. Own demographic change contributes to higher real interest rates in the United States and ROECD, as well as in developing countries. In Japan and Europe, the declining marginal product of capital is reºected in lower real interest rates. Once the global demographic change is accounted for, higher real interest rates are experienced everywhere. This is not surprising, as countries with high marginal products of capital because of rising effective labor forces will attract capital from aging countries and hence drive up real interest rates globally, even with capital restrictions adjusted for. Over time, as the demographic shocks work their way through the global economy, real interest rates decline everywhere. These are quite dramatic changes. For example, the real interest rate falls by 200 basis points over 45 years in the United States. In most developing countries, this change is closer to 400 basis points, whereas for China it is an intermediate 300 basis points. rapidly growing economies increases there is a fall in the relative price of these products on world markets (i.e., a real depreciation). Offsetting this is the effect of the global reallocation of capital which tends to appreciate the real exchange rates of countries receiving capital inºows and depreciate the real exchange rate of those countries losing capital. The next effect of these two inºuences is that over the next few decades the real exchange rates of industrial economies are predicted to appreciate and of developing countries to depreciate.
Summary and policy implications
This paper has used a 10-region global macroeconomic model with demographic dynamics to explore the impact of current and projected future global demographic change on the global economy. The paper illustrates that it is possible to use new theoretical developments in modeling overlapping generations in large-scale quantitative models with signiªcant country coverage to form a global picture of the con- sequences of demographic change. Clearly there are a large number of critical assumptions that drive the results, and we plan to undertake a wide range of sensitivity tests of these assumptions in future research. It is assumed that social security systems function reasonably well in each economy in order to capture the pure macroeconomic effects of demographic change. 13 In addition, more work is required in the modeling of developing countries, which make up a majority of the 120 Asian Economic Papers
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13 It is challenging to incorporate the features of social security systems in each of the 10 regions. Bryant (2004b) and his team have shown how important this can be in a small-scale theoretical model.
Figure 14. Contribution to real exchange rates of own versus global demographic change
countries in this new model and in which important demographic changes are projected to occur. A number of key issues, such as the impact of surplus labor, infrastructure needs, and the role of the informal sector, are being added to the G-Cubed models. These more realistic features of developing countries may change the spillover from demographic change in developing countries to the rest of the world.
There are at least two important policy implications from this new research. The ªrst is that the projected demographic transition in the global economy will most likely have important macroeconomic impacts on growth, trade ºows, asset prices (real interest rate and real exchange rates) and investment rates. The second is that policymakers should not ignore the global demographic transition when focusing on domestic issues related to demographics. The fact that the demographic transition is at different stages across countries, particularly in industrialized countries relative to developing countries, implies that the global nature of demographic change cannot be ignored. This paper shows that the developing world has important impacts on the industrial economies. As well as creating a framework for exploring a range of possible policy responses directly related to demographics, future work will use this new model to explore how other policies, apparently unrelated to demographics, might impact the macroeconomy to offset any negative consequences or reinforce any positive consequences of global demographic change. A ªrst attempt at this is contained in a recent paper using a four-region version of the model in this project by Batini, Callen, and McKibbin (2005) . That paper explores the impacts of productivity improvements induced by economic reform and lowering the barriers to international capital ºows in developing countries. Other issues to which this new framework can be applied include the ability to use trade reform as a way of allowing labor-intensive goods to ºow into rapidly aging societies such as Japan and enable domestic labor to be reallocated into activities that more directly support an aging society. There is no reason why policies in other parts of the economy might not have a more substantial positive contribution to dealing with demographic change than the more direct policies that are usually proposed, such as increased migration, subsidies to childbirth or changes in retirement ages. The ability offered by the model developed in this paper to assess a wide range of alternative policies aimed at dealing with the global demographic transition suggests an exciting new area of policy evaluation.
Appendix. The analytical approach
This appendix summarizes the analytical approach followed in incorporating demographics into the model. The reader is referred to more detailed documentation in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) and McKibbin and Nguyen (2004) , as well as online at http:/ /www.gcubed.com
A.1 Adult population
In each period, a cohort of children matures and joins the adult population. The size of the newly matured cohort, at time s, with respect to the existing adult population, N(s), is referred to as the maturity rate, b(s). The maturity rate and its relationship to the population of children will be addressed in another section below. Following Blanchard (1985) , we make the simplifying assumption that at any time s, all adults in the economy face the same mortality rate, p, deªned here as the probability of any given agent's dying before the next period. 14 The number of adults who matured at a previous time s who are still alive at a subsequent time t is given by
The adult population size can then be determined for any time t by summing the number of living adults from all of the cohorts that have ever matured:
where N(t) represents the adult population size at time t.
Taking the derivative with respect to time yields an equation governing the evolution of the adult population size over time:
The above equation has a simple interpretation: the adult population grows at a rate determined by the maturity rate less the mortality rate.
A.2 Child population
In every period, a cohort of children is born. If we think of the adult population as representing the set of potential parents, then it follows that the size of a newly born cohort will depend upon the current adult population size and the birth rate, b m . The expression for the number of children born at time s who are still alive at a later time t is thus given by
The aggregate number of children, M(t), can be calculated by summing the number of surviving children who were born recently enough that they have not yet reached adulthood. If we let ⌬ represent the ªxed number of years from when a child is born to when it reaches adulthood, that is, the period of childhood, 15 then
Differentiating with respect to time,
(Note that in the ªnal exponential, p⌬ refers to the period of childhood multiplied by the mortality rate; it does not represent a change in p.)
A.3 Relationship between the birth rate and the maturity rate Of the children who were born at time t Ϫ ⌬, those who survive will mature at time t, at which time they are added to the adult population. Thus, the maturity rate at time t is dependent on the birth rate and adult population size of ⌬ years past, as well as the mortality rate:
Now, we know that
so given the birth rate of ⌬ years ago and the maturity rates over the last ⌬ years, the current maturity rate can be determined:
Since the maturity rates over the last ⌬ years will be dependent on previous values of the birth rate, it is clear that the rate of maturity is predetermined by any given series of birth rates.
A.4 Adult consumption
Adults attempt to maximize the expected utility derived from their lifetime consumption. Adults must take into account the uncertainty of their life spans and thus they discount their planned future consumption by the probability that they may not survive through to future periods. Assuming a logarithmic utility function, each agent will maximize the following:
subject to the budget constraint
where c(s,t) is the consumption, at time t, of an adult who matured at time s; is the rate of time preference; w(s,t) is the ªnancial wealth that an adult who matured at time s holds at time t; and r(t) is the interest rate earned on ªnancial wealth. Financial wealth includes domestic bonds, equity, and foreign assets from all countries in the models. In addition to interest payments, adults also earn a rate of p on their holdings of ªnancial wealth, because of the assumption of a life insurance market, as in Blanchard (1985) . Children do not play a part in the life insurance market, nor do they earn interest, as they are assumed to hold no ªnancial wealth. In the full model, the c(s,v) function also includes a complete set of all goods from all countries in the models. Within each period, once aggregate consumption for that period is determined, the allocation across goods from different countries is determined based on relative prices of goods distinguished by place of production.
The optimal consumption path for an adult can be shown to be
where c(s,t) is the consumption, at time t, of an adult who matured at time s, and h(s,t) represents the human wealth of the adult. An adult's human wealth is deªned as the present value of the adult's expected income over the remainder of his or her lifetime:
At any time t, the sum of ªnancial wealth and human wealth-w(s,t) and h(s,t)-represents an adult's total wealth: the means by which the adult can pay for his or her future consumption. Adults consume a proportion of their total wealth each period, the proportion being determined by their rate of time preference and their likelihood of perishing before the next period.
Aggregate adult consumption, aggregate ªnancial wealth, and aggregate human wealth are simply the sums of the consumption, ªnancial wealth, and human wealth for all adults in the economy:
where C N (t) represents aggregate adult consumption, W(t) is aggregate ªnancial wealth, and H(t) is aggregate human wealth.
The adult aggregate consumption function can be shown to be given by
A.5 Labor supply and demographic considerations Empirically, one of the key economic characteristics that changes with age is the income that a person receives. This is usually summarized in an age-earnings proªle of a country. An example of the age-earnings proªle for Japan is given in ªgure 4. This shows the income of a cohort as they move through time relative to their initial earning as the 15-24 cohort. This is remarkably stable over 30 years and is similar, although not identical, across countries. It shows that as new workers enter the workforce, their income gradually rises over time, presumably reºecting productivity improvements over time. From the 50-55 cohort, income begins to fall over time, but there is still positive income after age 65. We introduce this age-earnings proªle into the model, such that an agent's income is determined by his or her age. We then aggregate over cohorts over time. Further, we assume that only adults earn labor income and that children are completely dependent upon adults. Faruqee (2000a) utilizes hump-shaped age-earnings proªles for adults, ªtted to Japanese data using nonlinear least squares (NLS). Intuitively, the hump-shaped proªle of age-earnings reºects the fact that young adults generally have incomes that are increasing as the young individuals age and gain more experience. After a certain age, however, earnings decline, reºecting ªrst the decreasing productivity associated with aging, and then eventually reºecting retirement behavior.
Individual income is not speciªed as suddenly dropping to zero at a given retirement age, for two reasons. First, in practice, people typically retire at various ages, and some retirees continue to earn alternative forms of income even after retirement. Second, a discontinuous age-earnings proªle introduces complications with respect to implementation in the MSG-Cubed model.
We model the evolution of income over the life cycle by beginning with the assumption that individuals are paid a wage for each unit of effective labor that they supply. We also assume that effective labor supply is a function of an individual's age and of the current state of technology. Aside from aging considerations, note that as time passes, the technological progress in the economy has a positive effect on the value of effective labor supplied by all agents.
The effective labor supply, at time t, of an agent who has been an adult since time s is given by
The e t component (where is the rate of technological progress) captures productivity increases resulting from advancements in technology. The remaining terms represent the nonlinear functional form used to estimate the hump-shaped proªle. The a i and ␣ i parameters are estimated, based on empirical data, using NLS. 16 The hump-shaped effective labor supply speciªcation will in turn lead to a humpshaped age-earnings proªle.
Individual labor supply can be rewritten as
where
and
Thus, the evolution of an adult's labor supply over time is given by
Aggregate effective labor supply in the economy for any time t, L(t), is the sum of the effective labor supplied by all adults in the economy:
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16 Values used in this paper for Japan are as estimated by Faruqee (2002) for Japan: ␣ 1 ϭ 0.073, ␣ 2 ϭ 0.096, ␣ 3 ϭ 0.085, and a 1 ϭ a 2 ϭ 200. In the theoretical model, to be consistent with Bryant (2004a) , we use the U.S. parameters for both countries: ␣ 1 ϭ 0.08152, ␣ 2 ϭ 0.12083, ␣ 3 ϭ 0.10076, and a 1 ϭ a 2 ϭ 200.
where L i (t) ϭ n t −∞ ∫ (s,t)l i (s,t) ds .
It can then be shown that
(t)N(t)
. (26) The intuition behind the equation above is that the aggregate labor supply of the economy changes as the entire population ages and also as new agents mature into the labor force.
In the application in this paper we use the estimated age-earnings proªle for Japan and the estimated U.S. age-earnings proªle for all other regions. This is a crude approximation in lieu of obtaining sufªcient data to estimate a more extensive set of age-earnings proªles.
A.6 Intergenerational transfers
In our stylized model, children differ from adults in that they do not provide labor supply (and thus do not receive payment for labor) and they do not hold ªnancial wealth. Children are dependent upon their parents; each child receives an intergenerational transfer every period, c(t), which is completely consumed by the child. As they do not make any consumption decision, but rather entirely consume their transfer, we do not need to account for their human wealth.
We assume that c(t) grows at the rate of productivity growth, . As the economy becomes more efªcient in production, children beneªt:
The simplest speciªcation 17 for adult transfer payments is to assume that adults share the burden of supporting children equally, that is, 
j(t) ϭ c(t)␦(t)
. (31) Aggregate consumption for the whole economy, then, is the sum of aggregate adult consumption and aggregate child consumption:
C(t) ϭ ( ϩ p)[A(t) ϩ H(t)] ϩ c(t)M(t) . (32)
A.7 Income and human wealth In the presentation above, individual human wealth was deªned as the expected present value of future income over an adult's remaining lifetime. Having deªned the proªle of labor supply over the life cycle, we can now be more explicit with respect to income. An adult's income is after-tax labor income, plus government transfers, less lump-sum taxes and intergenerational transfers:
y(s,t) ϭ [1 Ϫ (t)]w(t)l(s,t) ϩ tr(t) Ϫ tx(t) Ϫ j(t) ,
where y(s,t) denotes the income, at time t, of an adult who matured at time s; l(s,t) is the individual effective labor supply; (t) is the marginal tax rate; and w(t) is the wage paid per unit of effective labor. We assume that the distribution of lump-sum taxes, tx, and government transfers, tr, is uniform across the population; thus the year of an individual's coming of age is not a determinant of either of these two variables.
We deªne aggregate adult income as 
The intuition for the equation above is that as time passes, future earnings are no longer as distant in time and should therefore be discounted by a lesser magnitude-this explains the (r ϩ p) growth-while at the same time, some income has just been received and thus can no longer be considered part of human wealth-this explains why the current period's income is subtracted.
We can show that the evolution of aggregate human wealth is governed by the following relationship:
(t) ϭ r(t)H(t) Ϫ Y(t) ϩ h(t,t)n(t,t)
.
The intuition behind the equation above is that aggregate human wealth changes over time as future income draws nearer; thus H grows at the rate of r. The presence of death, and hence p, does not affect aggregate human wealth, because insurance companies redistribute the wealth of the dead. Further, in each period, people receive income, and having been received, it can no longer be considered human wealth. The last term on the right-hand side represents the new human wealth that the newly matured cohort brings to the economy in each period.
